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The origins of politeness research 
Politeness is a key means by which humans work out and maintain interpersonal 
relationships. Many of us have been educated how to behave politely since childhood; we 
only have to think about parents prescribing to their children when and how to apologise, to 
say “please” and “thank you” (at least in English), or to call (jiao) people by familial titles 
when greeting them (at least in Chinese). However, politeness is not limited to conventional 
acts of linguistic etiquette like formal apologies, so-called “polite” language and address 
terms, even though it includes all of these acts. Rather it covers something much broader, 
encompassing all types of interpersonal behaviour through which we take into account the 
feelings of others as to how they think they should be treated in working out and maintaining 
our sense of personhood as well as our interpersonal relationships with others. 
 Discourse about appropriate ways of behaving and interacting with others has a long 
and venerable history in East Asia. The teachings of Confucius and his disciples have been 
widely referenced in ideologies of appropriate behaviour that have developed, not only in 
China over the past two thousand years, but also in other East Asian countries. Discourse on 
li (‘propriety’ or ‘rite’), one of the key emic politeness concepts in East Asia, is said to have 
its origins even further back in time in the ideal behaviour of the great rulers of the Zhou 
Dynasty nearly three thousand years ago (Haugh 2011). However, while work on ‘politeness’ 
in China has a long native ‘proto-scientific’ research history (Kádár and Pan 2011), it is only 
in the past forty years that politeness has become the object of systematic, scientific research. 
This move towards situating the study of politeness within the social sciences more 
broadly, and linguistics and related fields more specifically, was stimulated by seminal work 
by Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), which all form part 
of what is now known as the “first wave” of politeness research (Culpeper 2011; Grainger 
2011). The most influential first-wave theory of politeness was introduced in the monograph 
Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage, written by Penelope Brown and Stephen 
Levinson (1987).2 Brown and Levinson’s framework aimed to model politeness as implicated 
through forms of linguistic behaviour when the (Gricean) conversational maxims are flouted 
in order to avoid threats to face. This framework still has an unprecedented status both within 
and outside the field of pragmatics, in spite of the subsequent emergence of various critiques 
of its ethnocentric bias, most notably from East Asian scholars (e.g. Ide 1989; Mao 1994; 
Matsumoto 1988). In fact, even now when politeness is discussed in other areas of linguistics 
as well as disciplines such as social and anthropological studies, Brown and Levinson’s 
approach continues to be regarded as the definitive work on linguistic politeness, a point 
which is evident from it being referred to as “politeness theory” in many circles as if there 
were no other plausible approach to theorising politeness in existence. A second very 
influential first-wave theory of politeness, particularly in research on Chinese politeness, was 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter are taken from Kádár and Haugh (in press). 
2 It was, in fact, initially published in a shorter form in 1978 as part of an edited book, but most references to 
Brown and Levinson’s theory are generally to the book published in 1987. 
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that developed by Leech (1983; cf. 2007) in which he proposed a Principle of Politeness and 
attendant politeness maxims are necessary to complement Grice’s Cooperative Principle. 
 Yet while first-wave approaches, such as Brown and Levinson’s framework, have 
retained dominance in many areas of research outside of pragmatics, the field of politeness 
research itself has increased in scope and diversity since the beginning of the second 
millennium. In the past decade, certain critical ideas on linguistic politeness, such as the 
importance of making a distinction between lay and technical understandings of politeness, 
have been combined with a far-reaching methodological shift towards examining politeness 
situated in discourse and interaction (Locher and Watts 2005; Mills 2003; Watts 2003; cf. 
Haugh 2007). This methodological shift in politeness research is often referred to in the field 
as the so-called discursive turn, and underpins what is now referred to as the “second wave” 
of politeness research (Culpeper 2011; Grainger 2011). 
 In this introduction we first briefly introduce two key concepts underpinning first-
wave approaches to politeness, namely, the notions of face and politeness maxims. We next 
discuss some of the key features of the second-wave, or discursive turn in politeness research. 
This is followed by an approach to situating understandings of politeness which has been 
developed as part of a re-theorisation of politeness as social practice (Kádár and Haugh 
2013). The implications for situating politeness research in this volume are then briefly 
considered. 
 
Face and politeness theory 
In Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness, the key concern of interactants is 
claimed to be face. The concept of face as a technical term is derived from work in sociology 
(i.e. Goffman’s notion of face) and anthropology (i.e. Durkheim’s concept of positive and 
negative rites), and, according to Brown and Levinson, consists of two specific kinds of 
desires (‘face-wants’) attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in 
one’s actions (negative face), and the desire to be approved of (positive face). According to 
Brown and Levinson, some acts intrinsically threaten face. For example, a request is said to 
threaten negative face, while a criticism threatens positive face. Politeness arises through 
strategies that minimise the threat to face when such an act, which is labelled a face-
threatening act, occurs, thereby avoiding conflict. Politeness strategies can be directed at 
either (1) the hearer’s negative face, as when the speaker avoids presuming, coercing, 
personalising and emphasises the hearer’s status; or (2) the hearer’s positive face, as when the 
speaker claims common ground with the hearer, conveys that they are co-operators, and when 
he fulfills a wants of the hearer and so on. The former is termed negative politeness, while the 
latter is termed positive politeness. 
The notion of face is argued by Brown and Levinson to allow for politeness to be 
modelled universally, because it helps the researcher to make distinctions between cultures 
and smaller groups of language users according to whether they prefer politeness that appeals 
to the other’s positive face or negative face, that is, so-called ‘positive politeness’ and 
‘negative politeness’ cultures. However, according to Brown and Levinson, the notion of face 
they propose is meant to be fleshed out according to the culture in question: 
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“the bare bones of a notion of face which (we argue) is universal, but which in any 
particular society we would expect to be the subject of much cultural elaboration.” 
(1987: 13) 
 
One key debate in politeness research has centred on whether this claimed universal notion of 
face does actually allow for cultural elaboration or is too tightly bound to a view of 
interaction as arising between independent, autonomous individuals who are fully rational 
(Mao 1994; Matsumo 1988). 
Influenced by Brown and Levinson’s theory, the assumed connection between 
politeness and face has become axiomatic in field over time, to the point that it now seems 
impossible to many to talk about politeness without examining the notion of face. The term 
“facework” for instance is now regarded by many as synonymous with politeness (Locher 
and Watts 2005). However, there have increasingly been calls for research that focuses on 
face as a topic in its own right, distinct and separate from politeness research in recent years. 
While it is now widely accepted that not all facework amounts to politeness a la Brown and 
Levinson, as has been convincing argued by Watts (2003) in his overview of politeness 
research, there have been a number of edited collections in recent years dealing with face as 
an important topic in its own right (Bargiela-Chiappini and Haugh 2009; Haugh and 
Bargiela-Chiappini 2010). The essential argument being made is that face and politeness 
should be disentangled from each other as they constitute important areas of research in their 
own right (Haugh 2013). Thus, while Brown and Levinson’s theory remains influential in 
politeness research, it is important to bear in mind that it leaves unanswered the question of 
how face should be theorised and analysed, a point which is of particular interest in Chinese, 
and indeed in many other languages. 
 
The Politeness Principle and politeness maxims 
While Leech makes an argument that politeness operates in various ways in different cultures 
or language communities, he nevertheless claims that a common factor behind culturally 
different manifestations of politeness behaviour is their overall function of avoiding conflict 
and promoting cooperative interactions. He proposes this overall function can be represented 
through the Politeness Principle which is intended to provide an account for why implicatures 
arise, thereby complementing Grice’s Cooperative Principle. The Politeness Principle itself 
was originally formulated as: “Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite 
beliefs” and “Maximize (others things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs” (Leech 
1983: 81). Leech’s theory goes on to argue that politeness avoids interpersonal conflict by 
decreasing the cost and increasing the benefit for the hearer, while increasing the cost and 
decreasing the benefit for the speaker. That is, the less the action proposed in an utterance 
“costs” and the more “benefit” it brings to the hearer, the more polite it becomes. This is 
formalised in his revised Grand Strategy of Politeness: 
 
“In order to be polite, S expresses or implies meanings which associate a high value 
with what pertains to O (O = other person(s), mainly the addressee) or associates a 
low value with what pertains to S (S = self, speaker).” (Leech 2007: 181; cf. 1983: 81) 
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For example, “Make the sandwiches” is regarded as less polite (all things being equal) than 
“Have another sandwich” because the former implies a cost to the hearer (i.e. he is requested 
to do some work), while the latter involves something of potential benefit to the hearer (i.e. 
something is offered). Politeness is, according to Leech, a means of symbolically decreasing 
the cost incurred or the benefit accrued to the hearer. For instance, the form “Would you 
mind making some sandwiches?” is a symbolic expression of the speaker’s intention to 
decrease the cost to the hearer, and the hearer is assumed to be able to infer this intention 
based on the assumption that he is maintaining the maxim “Be polite”. On the analytic level, 
then, Leech’s theory describes the politeness value of an utterance by means of a “cost-
benefit scale,” that is, a scale which represents the cost/benefit value of actions. These cost-
benefit scales are fleshed out through various politeness maxims (Leech 1983) or “pragmatic 
constraints” (Leech 2007).  
In the original presentation of his theory, Leech (1983) proposed six politeness 
maxims: “tact maxim (minimise cost to other; maximise beneft to other), generosity maxim 
(minimise benefit to self; maximise cost to self), approbation maxim (minimise dispraise of 
others; maximise praise of others), modesty maxim (minimise praise of self; maximise 
dispraise of self), agreement maxim (minimise disagreement between self and other; 
maximise agreement between self and other), sympathy (minimise antipathy between self and 
other; maximise sympathy between self and other)” (p.132). These were subsequently re-
organised in Leech’s (2007) revised list of pragmatic constraints that follow from the Grand 
Strategy of Politeness, namely: Generosity/Tact (place high value on O’s wants and low 
value on S’s wants), Approbation/Modesty (place high value on O’s qualities and low value 
on S’s qualities), Obligation (place high value on S’s obligation to O and low value on O’s 
obligation to S), Opinion (place high value on O’s opinions and low value on S’s opinions) 
and Feeling (place high value on O’s feelings and low value on S’s feelings) (p.182). While 
the maxims are framed as universally applicable, Leech’s approach allows for culture-
specific adaptations. One striking example of this is in Gu’s (1990) influential work, where 
he proposes versions of the maxims that reflect norms of politeness in Chinese, such as the 
self-denigration maxim and address maxim (cf. Kádár 2007; Pan and Kádár 2011). Leech’s 
Politeness Principle approach has thus engendered an exploration of politeness maxims 
across cultures, in particular, in relation to how they apply to norms of politeness in Chinese. 
 
The discursive turn in politeness research 
It is often argued that the discursive turn started with the publication of a book that launched 
a far-reaching critique of first-wave approaches to politeness by Gino Eelen (2001) A 
Critique of Politeness Theory, which has its roots, in turn, in an earlier edited collection by 
Watts, Ide and Ehlich (eds., 1992). However, while enormously influential amongst 
politeness researchers, the impact of this work has not yet reached the stature of first-wave 
approaches, since, thus far, no theory has been able to significantly dent the popularity of the 
Brown and Levinsonian framework across various disciplines. Furthermore, Eelen did not 
attempt to develop a theoretical framework per se, but rather was engaged in a self-reflexive 
exercise, essentially undertaking a critique of theoretical and methodological problems in the 
field. Thus, while highly influential, Eelen’s book did not create a theoretical paradigm for 
examining politeness like Brown and Levinson, although it was successful in drawing 
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attention to the need to devote greater attention to the participants’ perspective in studying 
linguistic politeness. This focus on the participant has become a cornerstone in the major 
body of post-2000 politeness research. 
The move to focus more carefully on the participants’ perspective motivated 
researchers to distinguish between two different perspectives on politeness, the distinction 
between so-called first-order and second-order politeness. In general, a first-order 
conceptualisation refers to the way in which a phenomenon is perceived by its users, while 
second-order describes a more abstract, scientific conceptualisation of the given 
phenomenon. In relation to politeness, as Watts, Ide and Ehlich (1992) first argued, first-
order politeness involves “commonsense notions of politeness” (p.3), that is, the “various 
ways in which polite behaviour is perceived and talked about by members of sociocultural 
group” (p.3). Second-order politeness, on the other hand, is a technical term “within a theory 
of social behaviour and language usage” (p.3), that is, it is the way in which politeness is 
defined and conceptualised by theorists. For example, the anthropologist William Foley 
(1997: 270) defines politeness as “a battery of social skills whose goal is to ensure everyone 
feels affirmed in a social interaction”. While this is a useful definition, it is obvious that it is a 
technical description, and if a man or woman on the street were asked to provide a definition 
he or she would provide a quite different description. 
 What has become clear over four decades of research through studies carried out in 
both the first-wave and second-wave approaches, then, is that politeness is always situated: in 
particular societies, cultures, in various institutional, interpersonal or public contexts, in 
certain interaction types or genres, as well as in various different relational networks 
(Bargiela-Chiappini and Kádár 2011; Davies, Haugh and Merrison 2011). Another key 
finding of research has been that evaluations of politeness can vary across individuals, even 
when they are – at least nominally – from the same social group (Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; 
Haugh 2010). This variability, and the moral implications of such evaluations, means that 
understandings of politeness can be contested. In other words, people don’t always agree 
about what is polite, impolite and so on. And not only that, these evaluations can have 
significant consequences for the parties involved. 
Consider the following excerpt from the movie, “The Social Network”, for instance. 
Up until the point that this excerpt begins, Mark and Erica have been talking about Mark’s 
“obsession” with getting into a “final club” (i.e. an undergraduate social club) at Harvard 
University. 
 
(1) Mark:  I want to try to be straight forward with you and tell you that I think 
you might want to be a little more supportive. If I get in I’ll be taking  
you to the events, and the gatherings and you’ll be meeting a lot of  
people you wouldn’t normally get to meet. 
Erica:  You would do that for me? 
Mark:  We’re dating. 
Erica:  Okay, well I want to try and be straight forward with you and let  
you know that we’re not anymore. 
Mark: What do you mean? 
Erica:  We’re not dating anymore, I’m sorry. 
Mark: Is this a joke? 
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Erica:  No, it’s not. 
Mark:  You’re breaking up with me? 
Erica:  You’re going to introduce me to people I wouldn’t normally have 
  the chance to meet? What the fff--What is that supposed to mean? 
Mark:  Wait, settle down. 
Erica: What is it supposed to mean? 
[omitted section] 
Mark:  All I meant is that you’re not likely to, currently, I wasn’t making a  
comment on your parents - I was just saying you go to B.U., I was  
stating a fact, that’s all, and if it seemed rude then of course I apologize. 
Erica:  I have to go study. 
Mark:  You don’t have to study. 
Erica:  Why do you keep saying I don’t have to study?! 
Mark:  Because you go to B.U.! ((pause)) 
Do you want to get some food? 
Erica:  I’m sorry you’re not sufficiently impressed with my education. 
Mark:  And I’m sorry I don’t have a rowboat so we’re even. 
Erica:  I think we should just be friends. 
Mark:  I don’t want friends. 
Erica:  I was being polite, I have no intention of being friends with you. 
        (“The Social Network”, 2005) 
 
It is quite apparent here that Erica has been offended by Mark’s remarks at the beginning of 
this excerpt. This offence arises from what he has implied by saying that she’ll get to meet a 
lot of people she wouldn’t normally get to meet if he gets into a final club, namely, that she is 
not as good as those people. Erica initially responds sarcastically before going on to say she 
does not want to continue dating him. She then explicitly holds him accountable for what he 
has implied by asking him “what is that supposed to mean?”, displaying her apparent anger at 
his remarks through the prosodic contour of her responses, as well as through an 
incompletely uttered “what the fuck?” It is obvious that Mark has implied something about 
Erica’s person, casting her as someone of a lower social level (than him). What is most 
interesting is that Mark initially seems oblivious to the potentially offensive implications of 
his remarks. As it becomes obvious to him that Erica is indeed offended, he moves to clarify 
what he meant and to apologise. However, his apology is qualified in that he only recognises 
that she might have thought he was being “rude”, and he maintains his “intended” meaning, 
namely, that she will get to meet better people than go to Boston University (B.U.) is simply 
a “fact”, and thus presumably not offensive. Erica, however, does not accept his apology, and 
says she wants to leave and that they should just be “friends”. When Mark responds that he is 
not interested in being friends with her, Erica claims that what she meant was really she no 
longer wants to date him, and that talk of being friends was just for the sake of being “polite”.  
In this brief except, then, Mark and Erica have not evaluated his initial remarks in the 
same way. On the one hand, Erica is upset and offended and moves to break up with Mark. 
On the other hand, Mark is initially oblivious to the offensive implications of his remarks, 
and even later maintains they are only potentially offensive because Erica “misunderstood” 
him. They also do not have the same understanding of what Erica means by saying that they 
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should just be “friends”. For Erica, this is a “polite” way of breaking up with someone 
because it draws from a recurrent practice or convention for doing just that, a point which 
Mark appears to miss. Even between two people from the same culture (mainstream white 
Americans), with a similar background as college students in the north east of the U.S., 
engaging in a joint activity (i.e. a date), then, there is no apparent agreement about what is 
polite or rude. The perceived rudeness or offensiveness of Mark’s remarks from Erica’s 
perspective has very real world consequences in that it leads to the end of their relationship, 
although Mark is apparently left somewhat bewildered as to why she is so offended. Of 
course, we, the audience, are positioned to judge Mark as the “strange” one who does not 
know how to interact appropriately with girls. But there’s no guarantee, even though it is 
likely, that everyone watching this scene would evaluate Mark’s behaviour in the same way. 
We as the audience know what we are supposed to think of Mark, but that doesn’t mean 
that’s what everyone really does think. After all what we think of the fictional character Mark 
may be influenced by what we think of the real living person he is supposed to be based on 
(that is, the founder and CEO of Facebook). 
 There are at least two points that follow from examining this excerpt. First, we can 
see evidence of variability in, and contestation of, evaluations of politeness on two levels 
here: on one level, between Mark and Erica, on a second level, between the audience and the 
writers or creators of this film. This is important to note, because it illustrates how when we 
are studying politeness we are in many cases like an audience. We’re not in the same position 
as the participants themselves in evaluating particular situated behaviour as polite, impolite 
and so on. We as analysts thus need to distinguish our own evaluations of politeness (which 
follow from forming our own understandings of an interaction), and those of the participants 
themselves, a point which has been emphasised in the second-wave distinction between first-
order and second-order understandings of politeness. However, not only do we need to 
distinguish between the evaluations of participants and analysts, we also need to distinguish 
between different understandings of participants themselves. Second, it is obvious not only 
from what Erica says and implies here, but also from Erica’s facial expressions and tone of 
voice (if you watch the actual clip from the movie), that she has been offended by Mark’s 
remarks. In other words, evaluations of politeness do not reside only in what people say. 
They are more often than not embodied in prosody, facial expressions, gestures and the like. 
Any examination of politeness must therefore at least recognise that it is very often 
multimodal in nature, even if analysts choose to restrict their analysis to primarily linguistic 
aspects of discourse and interaction.  
 
Situating understandings of politeness 
It has thus become evident over the past decade that we can no longer treat politeness as 
something that can be straightforwardly identified. This is because there are in fact often 
multiple different understandings of politeness at play in discourse. Because there are 
multiple ways of understanding politeness we need to start talking of understandings of 
politeness, as we indicate in the title of this chapter, rather than any one single understanding. 
Various different disciplinary and theoretical perspectives are thus necessary, in turn, in order 
to tease out these multiple understandings of politeness. While these various understandings 
offer different insights, which may at times be complementary, they must also be carefully 
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situated relative to one another in order to avoid theoretical or methodological incoherence 
(or to use an oft-used metaphor in English, to make sure we are comparing apples with 
apples, not apples with bananas). 
In Kádár and Haugh (2013), we revisit the first-second-order distinction, and 
introduce a framework which situates understandings of politeness relative to four key loci of 
analysis, not just two (see also Haugh 2012). Our point is that in order to effectively study 
politeness we must first begin to appreciate that there are different ways of looking at the 
same phenomena, and we need to be aware of how these different understandings are situated 
relative to each other. 
One way of understanding the world is from the study of the nature of being, 
existence or reality, or what is called ontology. The word ontology comes from the Greek 
words ۲ȞĲȠȢ (óntos) and ȜȩȖȠȢ(logos) and literally means “the study of that which is”. The 
ontological perspective we take in our framework, namely, a social realist ontological 
position, necessarily assumes there is such a thing as politeness in the first place, and that it 
forms part of our social reality. 
Understanding the world also involves the study of the nature and scope of 
knowledge, or what is called epistemology. The word epistemology comes from the Greek 
words ۂʌȚıĲȒȝȘ (epistƝmƝ) and ȜȩȖȠȢ(logos), and literally means “the study of knowing”. An 
epistemological perspective on politeness is somewhat different in that it involves the 
question of how we look at the world and make sense of it. Since the notion of politeness is 
itself a way of making sense of our social world, then an epistemological perspective 
involves the questions of how we come to such understandings in the first place, and 
importantly whose understandings are involved. Our basic position is that such 
understandings arise in the interface of those perceiving the world and the perceived social 
reality.  
What the first-second-order distinction points to is that there are two quite different 
epistemological perspectives we can take in perceiving politeness as part of our presumed 
social reality, namely, that of the user (first-order) and that of the observer (second-order). 
However, given any understanding is necessarily situated within a “field” (chang), a dynamic 
relational network which is imbued with its own historicity as well as ongoing interaction and 
emerging relationships, we propose that understandings of politeness are necessarily 
embedded in the “field” of that user or observer. In other words, we advocate a social 
constructivist epistemology, where understandings of politeness are situated relative to 
“field” in which they are perceived. 
On the one hand, there is the view of the participants themselves. That is, the people 
who are themselves involved in the evaluative moments through which politeness arises. Of 
course, human communication has for a long time been supported by various technologies, 
and we are not restricted to direct, face-to-face communication. Even in historical times there 
were various mediated forms of communication, although with the rapid rise of more various 
communication technologies in recent years, mediated communication has become 
increasingly widespread and influential. In relation to politeness, then, we must also consider 
the understandings of meta-participants, that is, people whose evaluations of politeness arise 
through vicariously taking part in the interaction by viewing it on television or on the 
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Internet, for instance. Both participant and meta-participant understandings are first-order in 
the sense that they involve some kind of participation in the evaluative moment.  
On the other hand, there is the view of those who observe evaluative moments 
through which politeness arises. One can observe such moments spontaneously in an ad hoc 
manner. This is essentially the perspective of a lay observer. We are all lay observers when it 
comes to politeness, because we all engage in social interactions with others both as 
participants and meta-participants. However, there is another, more formalised way of 
observing that involves much more systematic and evidenced interpretations of evaluative 
moments. An understanding that arises through systematic and evidenced observation is that 
of an analyst. Both lay observer and analyst understandings are second-order in that they 
involve observation rather than participation in the social world. It is worth noting that these 
different loci of understanding are not mutually exclusive. An analyst is simultaneously a lay 
observer, and may, in some cases, also be a participant in the data at hand. 
 However, while the first-second-order distinction has generally been held to be 
between participant and analyst understandings of politeness, we suggest that this neglects a 
further two loci of understanding. Given evaluations of politeness are inevitably constituted 
within a “field”, we propose here that an additional first-order loci for understanding 
politeness that we need to consider is one rooted in the distinction between “insiders” and 
“outsiders” (relative to a particular relational or societal network), while an additional 
second-order loci for understanding politeness that we must take into account is one rooted in 
the distinction between “lay explanation” and “theory”.  
An insider perspective is that of an individual (or group of individuals) who hold 
themselves and others accountable to the backgrounded, and generally unnoticed, 
expectations that are constituted in a particular relational or societal network, or what is 
sometimes termed the “moral order” (Garfinkel 1967). Following the linguistic 
anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1967), the understandings of insiders, or “members”, are 
generally termed an emic perspective, and contrasted with the understandings of outsiders to 
a moral order, or what is termed an etic perspective. Emic understandings are not always 
made explicit, however, and indeed may remain tacit and understood amongst members to 
the extent they inform social practice. These are both first-order understandings because they 
each constitute a set of expectancies that practically inform the evaluative moments through 
which politeness arises. 
It is worth noting that in making a distinction between two kinds of first-order 
perspectives, that between participants and insiders/members, we are deliberately opening up 
a way for analysts to account for the fact that not everyone from the same society necessarily 
agrees about what counts as polite, impolite and so on in particular, situated interactions. Of 
course, in many instances the perspectives of a participant and member are co-present in one 
in the same person. But this is not always the case, as we saw in the example above. It is also 
evident in intercultural interactions that while all those present count as participants, they are, 
by definitions, insiders relative to different moral orders (i.e. different sets of expectancies). 
 Second-order epistemological understandings of politeness also involve explicit 
accounts or attempts at rationalising the ways in which people are polite, impolite and so on, 
and how something counts as polite, impolite and so on in the first place. On the one hand, 
sociocultural accounts of interpersonal phenomena, such as politeness, can be developed and 
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shared amongst ordinary users of a language. These constitute folk theoretic understandings 
of politeness. Emic (or etic) accounts of politeness that are made explicit amongst members 
(and sometimes shared with non-members) thus constitute folk theoretic understandings. On 
the other hand, explicitly defined and formalised accounts of politeness can be shared 
amongst scientific observers. Theoretical understandings of politeness (or what might be 
termed scientific theoretic understandings) are thus restricted to particular group, namely, a 
community of practice of scientific observers or academics. Theoretical understandings are 
required – at least ideally – to be constructed in such a way that they can be consistently 
applied by different scientific observers. Both folk theoretic and (scientific) theoretical 
understandings are second-order in that they involve conceptualisation rather than actual 
participation in the social world. 
To summarise, then, from a user perspective, there are four inter-related perspectives 
from which the nature of politeness, as an assumed part of our social reality, can be 
understood: 
 
1. Participant understandings     first-order participant 
    Meta-participant understandings 
2. Emic understandings    first-order expectancies 
 Etic understandings 
 
From an observer perspective, there are four inter-related ways in which we can account for 
how we evaluate something to be polite, not polite, impolite and so on in the first place. 
 
3. Lay observer understandings       second-order observer 
   Analyst understandings 
4. Folk theoretic understandings       second-order conceptualisations 
   Theoretical understandings 
 
There are thus four - not just two as commonly thought - important loci that constitute the 
first-second-order distinction, namely, participation (participant/meta-participant) and 
expectation (emic/etic), which are first-order loci of understanding, and observation 
(analyst/lay observer) and conceptualisation (theoretical/folk theoretic), which are second-
order loci of understanding. We thus propose a framework that situates understandings of 
politeness relative to these four key loci of the first-second-order distinction. This framework 
is summarised in Figure 1 below. 
 
     participant-        analyst- 
            meta-participant              lay observer 
 
 first            evaluative           second 
order            moment(s)           order 
 
         emic-                 theoretical- 
          etic               folk theoretic 
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Figure 1: Loci of understandings of politeness 
 
We are not suggesting that all of these different loci of understanding are important all of the 
time. In some cases some just a few loci of understanding may be salient. It depends on the 
nature of the questions being asked, and the nature of the interaction or discourse being 
observed. But it is also important to realise that one person can have multiple understandings 
of politeness at the same time. Indeed, if our aim is to grasp the nature of politeness then it is 
necessary to embrace the idea that we need to be talking more about understandings of 
politeness.  
 
Situating politeness research 
Given the multiple epistemological bases on which we form understandings of politeness, we 
argue it is important to situate one’s understanding of politeness vis-à-vis other approaches if 
the field as a whole is to make progress. While there has been a tendency for research 
employing theories and methodologies from first wave approaches to be quantitative in focus, 
and research employing theories and methodologies from second wave approaches to be 
more qualitative in focus, it is our view that both qualitative and quantitative paradigms have 
considerable potential to contribute to politeness research overall. One of the key challenges 
facing politeness researchers, however, is how we might reconcile qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Our view is that without careful consideration of the epistemological 
bases of the approach in question, any comparisons or cross-fertilisation is likely to lead to 
theoretical incoherence. In other words, it is important that politeness researchers begin to 
situate their understanding of politeness vis-à-vis other approaches. The framework we have 
proposed here is a way forward in achieving in that aim (for further detail see Kádár and 
Haugh 2013). 
 In this book, there are a variety of approaches and methodologies employed, which 
are mainly second-order in nature (but see Haugh and Chang as an exception). By examining 
politeness and teaching/learning, these inquiries fill an important knowledge-gap: they 
capture culture-specific and intercultural peculiarities of politeness in terms of education. A 
clear advantage of these macro-level approaches is that they inform the reader about the 
norms and quantitative tendencies of language usage in educational settings. Furthermore, the 
chapters of this book reveal a lot about the Chinese culture-specific understandings of 
politeness, from the perspective of scholars who are also natives of China; this makes it an 
important source for Western readers who have interest in Sinology. 
 It is hoped that this book opens up the way for further research, which merges 
language education and politeness research. 
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